The Incumbent Spending Puzzle

Publication Date

2012

Description

Objective This article seeks to explain the puzzle of why incumbents spend so much on campaigns despite most research finding that their spending has almost no effect on voters. Methods The article uses ordinary least squares, instrumental variables, and fixed-effects regression to estimate the impact of incumbent spending on election outcomes. The estimation includes an interaction term between incumbent and challenger spending to allow the effect of incumbent spending to depend on the level of challenger spending. Results The estimation provides strong evidence that spending by the incumbent has a larger positive impact on votes received the more money the challenger spends. Conclusion Campaign spending by incumbents is most valuable in the races where the incumbent faces a serious challenge. Raising large sums of money to be used in close races is thus a rational choice by incumbents.

Journal

Social Science Quarterly

Volume

93

Issue

4

First Page

932

Last Page

949

Department

Economics

This document is currently not available here.

Share

COinS