Publication Date
6-1-2025
Description
This article critically interrogates John R. Commons’ axiology embedded in his Reasonable Value principle. In doing so, Commons’ implicit commitments regarding power theory are made explicit by locating his power theory within Steven Lukes’ three-dimensional typology of power. Within Lukes’ typology, Commons’ understanding of power is classified as pluralist. This pluralistic conception of power is too narrow and cannot account for hegemonic power—power that operates through consent rather than coercion. By drawing on Radical Institutionalists’ hegemonic conception of power the biases and limitations of his axiological framework are laid out systematically by critiquing the three pillars of Commons’ reasonable value process: proportional representation, attainable idealism, and consensus. In doing so the unrecognized links between power theory and axiology are made explicit, demonstrating how Commons’ neglect of hegemonic power results in an axiological framework which uncritically reinforces existing power structures, biasing resolutions toward capitalist norms, while precluding transformative changes. Given Commons’ influence over the literature his axiological approach continues to be uncritically adopted in trying to address current crises. By not accounting for the biases and limitations embedded in this process, the limitations of the reasonable value process in addressing the scale of modern crises are unrecognized. To overcome these biases and limitations, requires a systematic accounting of hegemonic power, integrating these insights to expand the horizon of change, developing new axiological frameworks capable of addressing the root causes of today’s crises.
Type
Working Paper(unpublished)
Department
Economics