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Michael James  
mjames@bucknell.edu

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# Communicative Action, Strategic Action, and Inter-Group Dialogue

Michael Rabinder James  
*Bucknell University, Pennsylvania, USA*



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**ABSTRACT:** A consensus has emerged among many normative theorists of cultural pluralism that dialogue is the key to securing just relations among ethnic or cultural groups. However, few normative theorists have explored the conditions or incentives that enable inter-group dialogue versus those that encourage inter-group conflict. To address this problem, I use Habermas's distinction between communicative and strategic action, since many models of inter-group dialogue implicitly rely upon communicative action, while many accounts of inter-group conflict rest upon strategic action. Drawing on explanatory accounts of inter-group conflict, I outline five strategic logics of group conflict, what I call the resource, political, information, positional, and security logics. I then argue that these strategic logics cannot be overcome by three motivations commonly thought to support communicative action: moral-cognitive consistency, the normative characteristics of modernity, and publicity constraints. At this point, I turn to an empirical case, the reception of African-American concerns within the Jewish public sphere prior to the Second World War, in order to suggest that, although strategic incentives might hinder inter-group dialogue, they may also encourage it. In conclusion, I provide three recommendations for how theorists might utilize strategic incentives in order to recognize which actors, policies, or institutions can encourage inter-group dialogue.

**KEY WORDS:** *cultural pluralism, ethnic conflict, Habermas, inter-group dialogue*

A striking consensus is emerging among normative theorists of cultural pluralism. Dialogue, it seems, is the key for securing just relations among ethnic or cultural groups. Direct dialogue or mediated communicative processes among groups is a central focus in works by Simone Chambers, Shane O'Neill, Bhikhu Parekh, Charles Taylor, James Tully, and Iris Young.<sup>1</sup> Even Will Kymlicka, whose liberal, juridical theory of minority group rights is criticized for its apparent disregard for

Contact address: Michael Rabinder James, Bucknell University,  
Department of Political Science, Lewisburg, PA 17837, USA.  
Email: [mjames@bucknell.edu](mailto:mjames@bucknell.edu)

robust, discursive political participation, still concludes that relations among groups must be conducted through dialogue.<sup>2</sup> The apparent consensus is that justice within plural societies requires political arrangements that result from dialogues that take into account the varied cultural perspectives of the groups involved.

Various concerns support the turn to dialogue. Arriving at substantive principles of justice among groups may well require a dialogical process whereby members of different groups come to understand their divergent perspectives and beliefs. In turn, policies or rights based upon substantive principles of justice – such as affirmative action, group-based representation, or group self-government rights – often require a communicative process to specify their application or revision, particularly if claims to such policies are contested.<sup>3</sup> Alternatively, inter-group dialogue can mediate problems of cultural value conflict, in order to mitigate the dilemma of either imposing one group's cultural values upon another or remaining in a culturally relativistic *modus vivendi*, wherein groups at best tolerate but do not respect each other.<sup>4</sup>

But while good reasons support the connection between dialogue and justice among groups, the weakness of this consensus lies in its purely normative focus. Most proponents of dialogue assess only the moral validity of dialogue, without clarifying the conditions that either enable or constrain it. This failure becomes apparent when we consider that dialogue seems to presuppose a level of trust and openness among groups, dispositions that are often disconfirmed by empirical analysis, even when inter-group violence is absent. To the extent that such empirical analyses are correct, groups will engage each other strategically, rather than through the communicative processes that normative theorists favor. Because normative theorists overlook the conditions of dialogue, they also overlook how actors are constrained in their attempts to engage in this favored practice.

In this article, I draw on explanatory accounts of group conflict and Jürgen Habermas's framework of strategic and communicative action, in order to investigate how strategic dynamics affect the possibility of inter-group dialogue. I use Habermas's analysis of communicative action rather than models more directly concerned with inter-group dialogue for two reasons. First, most models of inter-group dialogue, while rejecting specific aspects of Habermas's framework, nevertheless assume that actors adopt the orientation towards understanding depicted by communicative action. Second, unlike most theorists of inter-group dialogue, Habermas carefully distinguishes communicative action from the strategic action assumed in empirical accounts of group conflict and cooperation. As a result, his framework can better initiate an examination of the strategic logics that enable and constrain inter-group dialogue.

In general, my argument supports three goals. Most broadly, I seek to clarify the conditions that enable inter-group dialogue in a manner that is more fine-grained than the accurate but vague appeals to communicative motivations com-

mon among theorists of dialogue. More precisely, I try to clarify how strategic logics constrain and enable different actors with respect to communicative orientations across group boundaries. Finally, I hope to prompt normative theorists to think more strategically about which actors, policies, and institutional reforms can foster inclusive dialogue and communication. My argument proceeds as follows. First, I clarify the relationship between communicative action, strategic action, and theories of inter-group dialogue. Second, I examine the strategic logics underlying many explanatory accounts of group conflict and cooperation. Third, I evaluate the motivations for communicative action in light of the strategic logics of group interaction. Fourth, I draw on an empirical case to illustrate how strategic dynamics can constrain or enable communicative action across group boundaries. Finally, I suggest how political theorists might examine strategic dynamics of group conflict in order to discern more clearly which political actors and political institutions can best support inter-group dialogue.

## **Communicative Action and Inter-Group Dialogue**

Habermas defines communicative action as the ‘interaction of at least two subjects capable of speech and action who . . . seek to reach an understanding about their action situation and their plans of action in order to coordinate their actions by way of agreement’.<sup>5</sup> Understanding, in turn, is a product of raising criticizable validity claims. This implies that understanding is not blind acceptance of every utterance that a speaker proffers: rather, understanding assumes that the speaker can provide reasons for the claims raised in speech. This orientation towards understanding distinguishes communicative action from teleological or goal-oriented action. Teleological action implies that actors are oriented not towards understanding others but only to achieving their predetermined goals. Strategic action is a subset of teleological action, whereby actors pursue their goals while incorporating how others may react strategically to their actions. According to Habermas, communicative action is intimately tied to teleological, goal-oriented action: actors engage in communicative action to resolve conflicts and thereby return to their pursuit of goals.<sup>6</sup> However, communicative action expects actors to suspend the pursuit of their goals in order to engage in communication *aimed at understanding*. This distinction can be clarified in four further steps.

First, communicative action cannot be equated with communication per se. Clearly, communication may be used strategically, as when rhetoric is used to manipulate listeners to act in a certain way.<sup>7</sup> While a communicative theorist like Iris Young may defend rhetoric as a valid means for fostering inter-group communication,<sup>8</sup> she uses rhetoric only to foster communicative understanding among groups, not as a means for one group strategically to manipulate another. Thus, while rhetoric departs from the rational argumentation portrayed in Habermas’s theory of discourse, Young’s use of it remains within the broader contours of communication oriented towards understanding. Habermas himself

seems to recognize this point, when he notes that the 'strategic elements within a use of language can be distinguished from strategic actions through the fact that the entire sequence of talk . . . stands under the presuppositions of communicative action'.<sup>9</sup> However, communicative action does bear a closer relationship to goal-oriented action than some other forms of communication, such as everyday banter or purely artistic communication pursued for its own sake. Communicative action depicts how actors reach agreement on context definitions and norms that allow them to resume the suspended pursuit of goals. We engage in communication to aid our goal-oriented action, not as an end in itself.

Second, while communicative action clearly is related to the pursuit of goals, what distinguishes it from strategic action is its orientation towards not only goals but also the cognitive frameworks within which goals are sought. Communicative action can depict how actors can alter their goals and cognitive frameworks by communicatively testing their validity. When an actor claims validity for a statement of objective truth, subjective sincerity, or normative rightness, communicative action depicts how others can contest such claims. For instance, communicative action reconstructs how one set of actors can contest the rightness of a second set's goals. Should the second set's goals conflict with the established social norms of the community, then communicative action could lead to one of at least three outcomes. The two sets of actors could reach an agreement whereby the second set replaces their goals with socially acceptable goals. Alternatively, the actors could reach an agreement whereby the community's norms are revised to incorporate the second set's previously unacceptable goals. Finally, the communicative process could result in a communicative rupture between the community and the second set of actors, leading the latter to engage the broader community not communicatively but strategically, say through bargaining.

Third, both communicative action and strategic action presuppose a level of reciprocal recognition on the part of the actors. Strategic action requires actors to recognize each other as strategically competent and rational. Actors are not objects or fixed parameters but are intentional, rational agents able to formulate and pursue goals and to anticipate and react to the actions of others.<sup>10</sup> Indeed, strategic conflicts can be resolved through the achievement of such strategic competence, for instance through strategies of instrumental reciprocity within iterated prisoner dilemma interactions.<sup>11</sup> Communicative action, however, requires a more demanding level of reciprocal recognition: participants must reciprocally recognize each other as communicatively competent actors, actors who must receive justifications when they contest the claims of others and in turn must provide justifications when their own claims are questioned. Thus, communicative reciprocity goes beyond the reciprocal recognition implied within strategic action. Communicative reciprocity recognizes actors with respect not only to their ability to pursue goals and react to actions but also to their ability to communicate competently and defend their goals and perceptions through meaningful interpretations, reasons, and justifications. It presupposes either a common

language or the ability to learn the language of the other, and it presupposes either a common lifeworld of shared meanings that the actors wish to preserve or the ability and willingness to understand the lifeworld of the other. In turn, such communicative action presupposes a level of respect for the potential validity of the claims raised by the other. While these claims can be tested, such testing must begin with the *prima facie* acceptance that, in principle, these claims can be justified. Thus, the communicative recognition of the other obliges actors to be open in two senses: to listen to the other, and to possess a moral personality that is receptive to the other's claims and criticisms.<sup>12</sup>

Finally, the importance of reciprocal communicative recognition is heightened when we note that communicative action proceeds on two levels: *unreflective* communicative action depicts how actors coordinate goal-oriented action by drawing on situation definitions or cultural meanings shared within a common lifeworld; *reflective* communicative action arises when actors explicitly question lifeworld meanings, as in the above case where actors question the validity of a community's norms. This is the role of power-free discourse or argumentation. While Habermas generally portrays reflective communication in terms of discourses that challenge traditionally held norms or definitions within a single lifeworld, communicative action that occurs across lifeworlds must presumably also be reflective, since meanings that are not shared cannot be unreflectively engaged.

Given this account, we must note that most theorists of inter-group communication tend to distance themselves from Habermas for at least three very good reasons. First, Habermas does not himself develop an explicit theory of intercultural communication, and his theory of communicative action seems to presuppose that actors share a common lifeworld. Second, there are problems with Habermas's specific formulation of critical, reflective communication as embodied within power-free argumentation. Argumentation itself may function as a form of power, since certain actors may be better equipped to engage in argumentative contests than others. In addition, argumentation poorly depicts the deeply cooperative character of gaining understanding across cultures.<sup>13</sup> Finally, Habermas's model of rational communication, in assessing the validity of statements via their claims to rightness, truth, or sincerity, contains important failings. For instance, one can question the validity of the validity criteria themselves, since goodness might be as acceptable a criterion of validity as rightness when dealing with political questions.<sup>14</sup> Nevertheless, I suggest that most models of intercultural dialogue, including the prominent models proposed by Charles Taylor, James Tully, and Iris Young,<sup>15</sup> do presuppose something like communicative action, as opposed to strategic action. This presupposition emerges through their reliance on an orientation towards understanding among dialogue participants, the contention that dialogue is not an end in itself but a means for reaching collective agreements, a concern that dialogue be critical and reflective, and the requirement that dialogue participants reciprocally recognize each other in a manner that exceeds reciprocal strategic recognition.

First, models of inter-group communication are oriented towards understanding. Tully draws on Wittgenstein's theory of family resemblances in order to depict how actors come to understand similarities between practices within their own culture and practices within an alien one. Taylor uses Gadamer's fusion of horizons to portray how actors from one culture come to understand and evaluate the practices of another culture by immersing themselves in the other culture and melding its standards of evaluation with one's own. Young depicts 'understanding across difference' whereby actors listen in order to learn from the other and correct possibly false beliefs about the other. In each case, inter-group communication requires an orientation towards understanding, not a strategic orientation towards attaining goals by negotiating the reactions of the other. In Young's case, this holds even when full understanding cannot be achieved, a point to be succeeded not by a strategic *modus vivendi* but by a stance of openness, whereby actors recognize their ignorance and seek to learn from the other.<sup>16</sup>

Note, however, that such inter-group communication is not mere talk for the sake of talk. For Tully, inter-group communication aims at mutually acceptable practical agreements, whereby diverse cultural communities can live together while pursuing the goal of preserving their distinct cultural practices. Taylor incorporates the goal of cultural survival but adds the goal of finding evaluative standards in order to determine whether there is truly something worth learning from the other. Young views dialogue as the means of securing just and respectful relations among members of diverse groups through not only dialogue itself but also specific policies and political institutions, which are justified precisely because they enable actors to fulfil their subjective goals of self-determination and self-development.<sup>17</sup> For all three, inter-group communication is neither mere talk nor strategic bargaining but a process of inter-group understanding aimed at mutual acceptable agreements that allow for the resumed pursuit of individual or collective goals.

Second, although none of the above theorists adopts Habermas's model of argumentative discourse, all implicitly presuppose that communication be reflective in two ways: it must be intentional and it must be potentially critical. Communication aimed at understanding distinct cultural perspectives is intentional because actors cannot fall back on shared understandings as can actors within a common lifeworld. Admittedly, Habermas's argumentative model of reflective communication is insufficient for depicting this task, since it does not adequately portray how actors intentionally try to understand alien practices or worldviews.

However, the critical character that Habermas identifies with reflective communication is perceptible within models of inter-group dialogue. Taylor holds that inter-group communication should not uncritically affirm the practices of the other, for to do so would ironically be disrespectful or ethnocentric. It would be ethnocentric if actors implicitly affirm foreign practices by using their own evaluative standards, thereby praising 'the other for being like us'. It would be

disrespectful if actors denied that any evaluative criteria existed, thereby reducing judgement to simple statements of strategic allegiance. Young also implicitly recognizes the role of criticism within inter-group dialogue, when actors criticize how others misunderstand their perspectives. True understanding is achieved only when actors can reach actual, partial agreements about cultural meanings that can withstand potential criticism. Such understanding, in turn, is the ground for mutual respect across difference. Even Tully, who most strongly rejects Habermas's disembodied portrait of critical reflection, nevertheless acknowledges the role of criticism within intercultural dialogue.<sup>18</sup> Thus, while Habermas's model of argumentative discourse may not suffice, inter-group dialogue does require a reflective and critical form of communicative action.

Third, this reflective form of communicative action presumes a robust form of reciprocal recognition. Taylor, Tully, and Young all place recognition at the center of their models of inter-group dialogue, depicting it as extending moral respect by being open to the other's communicative contributions, not as the recognition of the other's strategic capacities to achieve goals. For Taylor, recognition and openness are manifest in the 'presumption' that any long-standing cultural tradition potentially has something to teach others. This presumption of potential value grants moral respect to the other by opening the door to potentially critical dialogue, whereas the uncritical 'assumption' of value at best grounds strategic alliances. For Young, mutual recognition and openness enable moral respect by checking one's prior beliefs and realizing how the other is irreducibly different from oneself.<sup>19</sup> For Tully, mutual recognition is a necessary convention for inter-group communication, since it allows actors to communicate in their own 'languages and customary ways' and requires them to 'change perspectives' dialogically, by listening 'to the different stories others tell'.<sup>20</sup> In this sense, all three models of inter-group dialogue presume a form of reciprocal recognition among actors that reflects a communicative orientation towards understanding beyond the reciprocal recognition of the other's strategic capacities.

In viewing these models of inter-group dialogue through the lens of communicative action, I do not mean to dismiss how each one improves upon Habermas's own framework, which is clearly insufficient for grounding intercultural dialogue. My present purpose in using communicative action is only to reveal the orientation presupposed within inter-group dialogue. Strategic action and purely artistic communication for its own sake do not adequately portray the action within inter-group dialogue. Instead, communicative action oriented towards understanding lies at the core.

That being said, what is omitted is an analysis of the conditions confronting members of distinct groups who may wish to engage in such communicative understanding. What prompts actors to adopt a communicative rather than a strategic orientation towards members of other ethnic or cultural groups? What prompts communicative reciprocity and its openness? More pertinently, what prompts reflective communication, wherein members of different groups criticize

practices or beliefs held by themselves or others? Some communicative theorists turn to solidarity grounded in common or overlapping lifeworlds.<sup>21</sup> As Habermas puts it, 'Communicative action is a switching station for the energies of social solidarity'.<sup>22</sup> If actors wish to preserve and strengthen lifeworld solidarity, they should resolve their conflicts through communication. Yet amid cultural or ethnic pluralism, the existence of a common lifeworld or the extent of overlap among lifeworlds may come into question. Here, solidarity may be fragile and tenuous. It might be threatened not only through the colonization of a lifeworld by administrative or economic systems but also by strategic interactions among groups with distinct lifeworlds or whose lifeworlds barely overlap. Indeed, while communicative action under the guise of inter-group dialogue depicts a level of social interaction that transcends strategic action, the danger exists that some manifestations of strategic action may undermine the solidaristic basis for communicative action in plural societies.

## **The Strategic Logics of Group Conflict**

It would be a gross mischaracterization to claim that strategic action among groups necessarily leads to conflict. Strategic cooperation among groups is clearly possible and may even be the norm in plural societies.<sup>23</sup> Nevertheless, strategic action among groups can undermine the solidaristic basis for communicative action among groups. For this reason, it is worth examining how the empirical explanatory literature on ethnic and cultural pluralism identifies five strategic logics of group conflict: the resource logic, the political logic, the information logic, the positional logic, and the security logic.

The resource logic depicts how individuals strategically pursue external resources, such as wealth and its sources, by identifying with certain groups. Ethnic or cultural groups can effectively secure such resources, since they are often pre-existing and need not be created anew by individual actors. Moreover, such groups provide selective incentives, like group-specific cultural practices or shared languages, which can encourage collective action on behalf of groups. In this way, ethnic or cultural groups can function as particularly effective interest groups.<sup>24</sup>

The related but distinct political logic portrays how political elites, such as political party leaders or social movement entrepreneurs, strategically foster group identification and mobilization in order to gain political power. The goal of political power may be to distribute state-controlled resources disproportionately, although it may also involve symbolic goals associated with control of the state.<sup>25</sup> The political logic may manifest itself in at least three ways. First, within plural democracies, it may take the form of electoral competition among ethnically based political parties. Here, violence is often associated with electoral campaigns.<sup>26</sup> Second, the political logic may be based in ethnic social movements working outside electoral processes to capture political power, either through

secession or a coup. Finally, the political logic can also shape how political elites bargain over alterations in political institutions, like electoral systems.<sup>27</sup> In each case, a common phenomenon is the flanking strategy. For instance, an exclusive ethnic party may take a more extreme position along an ethnic political spectrum in order to capture support from a more ethnically inclusive party, as characterized by political competition between the Hindu nationalist BJP versus the more inclusive Congress Party in India. Alternatively, an extremist faction within a non-electoral ethnic movement may outflank a more moderate wing, as often occurs among splinter groups aligned with both Nationalist and Unionist movements in Northern Ireland or among different factions within the Basque separatist movement in Spain.<sup>28</sup>

The political and resource logics share the characteristic that elites tend to benefit disproportionately from group-based mobilization. Thus, empirical accounts often draw on other strategic logics, like the positional logic and the information logic, to explain why ordinary actors follow elites. The positional logic holds that individuals defend the esteem of their personal or collective identities by positioning themselves above the identities of others. For instance, men may position their gender identity above that of women by attributing to themselves greater levels of rationality, courage, and strength, while individuals of European extraction may position themselves above those from Asia or Africa by attributing to themselves traits of civility, culture, or refinement. The positional logic predicts that, when one group perceives another group as threatening the status of its identity, the threatened group will engage in economically irrational violent behavior and develop a concomitant, emotive antipathy toward out-groups.<sup>29</sup>

The information logic suggests that elite and ordinary actors confront different incentives regarding the acquisition and promulgation of information. On the one hand, non-elite actors often confront high costs in acquiring accurate information. Thus, they may gain only relatively cheap information from elite group leaders, group-specific media sources, or rumors.<sup>30</sup> On the other hand, ethnic elites have strong political and resource incentives to promulgate misleading but cheap group-specific information, since they tend to benefit disproportionately from group-based mobilization. As a result, ethnic elites have an incentive to promulgate to non-elites group-specific information that may foster group conflict in various ways: out-groups may be falsely portrayed as a violent threat; the economic benefits of group mobilization may be overstated; and myths and stereotypes may strengthen positional relations among groups. For instance, Indian political parties will often publicize instances of collective violence against groups who constitute important vote banks, while overlooking similar incidents against politically insignificant groups.<sup>31</sup> Similarly, ethnic economic elites may foster positional beliefs to undermine cross-group, working class alliances, as occurred when white elites undermined cross-racial populism in the American South.<sup>32</sup> The information logic clarifies the divergent elite and non-elite strategic

incentives to foster group mobilization, often in support of the resource or political logics.

Still, the presence of such strategic logics toward group mobilization need not lead to actual violent conflict. Indeed, ethnic competition over resources or political power is often peaceful. The emergence of violent conflict usually involves the initiation of the security logic in one of two ways. On the one hand, a breakdown of the state's coercive apparatus may create a quasi-Hobbesian state of nature, wherein groups confront each other in a security dilemma. While peaceful interactions may be most beneficial for both, fear of the coercive capacity of the other and the lack of a common police power may lead one group to take a pre-emptive strike and initiate violent conflict. Russell Hardin believes that this accurately describes the genesis of violence in the former Yugoslavia, where the death of Tito and the economic crises of the late 1980s weakened the coercive, peacekeeping capacity of the Yugoslav state.<sup>33</sup> On the other hand, the security logic can also prompt violence without the complete breakdown of the state. This occurs when some groups perceive, often correctly, that the coercive, peacekeeping apparatus of the state – the police force – is not impartial in its treatment of different groups. In this scenario, the disfavored group might choose between two options: either it may take the law into its own hands by using non-state means of coercive power, or it may follow the political logic to gain power over the state and, in turn, the police. The former strategy was adopted by Nationalists in Northern Ireland, whose peaceful civil rights movement turned to the IRA for protection when it appeared that the Royal Ulster Constabulary was favoring Protestants and indiscriminately attacking Catholics.<sup>34</sup> The latter strategy has at times been adopted by disfavored caste or religious groups in northern India, who sometimes used their demographic strength to gain power over the government and the police.<sup>35</sup>

The strategic logics of group conflict bear strong implications for communicative action across group boundaries. Even if violent group conflict is the exception rather than the norm, the logics of group conflict can undermine the trust and solidarity that ground communicative action across group boundaries. Moreover, these logics of conflict are present not only in poor democracies, such as India, or transitional societies, such as the former Yugoslavia, but also in established, plural democracies, such as the United States. For instance, the resource logic fostered violence between white and black workers during the early 20th century, and continued to foster hostility and distrust among working-class Blacks, Latinos, Asians, and Hasidic Jews in the 1990s.<sup>36</sup> The security logic, via police bias, may have fostered the 1965 Watts riot, the 1991 Crown Heights riot, and the 1992 Rodney King riots.<sup>37</sup> The political logic, in turn, can be seen in the use of racial stereotypes to gain political support in electoral campaigns.<sup>38</sup> It also was present in the political competition between Afro-Caribbeans and Lubavitcher Jews for control of community boards in Brooklyn.<sup>39</sup> The presence of these logics within an established, plural democracy should prompt greater concern for

communicative theorists. For while these theorists realistically restrict the domain of reflective communicative action to established democracies with institutionalized communication rights and a modern moral and political culture,<sup>40</sup> the logics of group conflict within such a democracy can nevertheless undermine cross-group communication. The fact that Bosnians negotiate with each other while Quebecers talk to each other truly is not a trivial difference,<sup>41</sup> but this difference may get blurred when we examine interactions among working-class immigrant groups in Brooklyn.<sup>42</sup>

To the extent that theorists of inter-group dialogue examine the logics of group conflict, they tend to focus only on the positional logic, given its analogy to racial prejudice. While this logic clearly can both promote violent conflict and undermine communicative action across groups, examining this logic without considering the others can lead to misleading results. For instance, Young attributes group conflict in Yugoslavia to the positional logic, or 'difference as otherness'. Yet Young's analysis fails to explain the genesis of this logic amid groups, which until recently enjoyed relatively equal levels of social power and had a weak sense of group identity.<sup>43</sup> Hardin's analysis of this case through recourse to the resource, information, and security logics provides a more thorough and convincing portrait.<sup>44</sup> For this reason, normative theorists of inter-group dialogue should more carefully examine how the various logics of group conflict may affect the possibility of inter-group dialogue.

## Communicative Motivations

The logics of group conflict provide strategic motivations that, even in the absence of violent conflict, can hinder the robust inter-group dialogue advocated by normative cultural pluralists. Still, one might argue that a strategic logic might instead motivate dialogue, since the costs of conflict or potential conflict might outweigh the costs of engaging in dialogue. While this often prompts some sort of communicative process among groups, it is less clear that it can support the robust dialogue associated with the intentional understanding and criticism of goals, beliefs, or perceptions that is implicit in most normative models.<sup>45</sup> Thus, we should examine motivations that cohere with the communicative orientation towards understanding that supports robust inter-group dialogue. In this vein, theorists of communicative action suggest motivations related to moral-cognitive consistency, normative characteristics of modernity, and publicity constraints.

Moral-cognitive consistency motivations compel a moral skeptic, who views morality as relative to each individual, to engage in moral argumentation.<sup>46</sup> These motivations can be divided into three parts. First, a moral skeptic, as an observer of moral phenomena, must admit that individuals are not thoroughly relativistic but in fact demand justifications for morally questionable attitudes and actions. Second, the skeptic could not consistently *argue* against the capacity to argue rationally about morals, since *arguing* this point would involve the skeptic in a

performative contradiction. Finally, the skeptic can deny the capacity to argue about morality, while simultaneously avoiding a performative contradiction, only by withdrawing from the community of moral arguers.<sup>47</sup> Because communicative action depicts intersubjective understanding through the possibility of contesting claims to validity, consistency requires the skeptic either to accept the validity of moral argument or to cease to belong to a community of communicative actors.

Given the character of inter-group dialogue and logics of group conflict, moral-cognitive consistency motivations do not get us very far. They focus only on the argumentative, critical aspect of reflective communicative action and fail to address the non-argumentative form of reflective communication across group boundaries that inter-group communication demands. Moreover, moral-cognitive consistency motivations pertain only to those actors who have already adopted a reflective level of communicative action, without clarifying what motivates actors to engage in reflective communicative action across group boundaries in the first place. Most importantly, moral-cognitive consistency motivations fail to address how the logics of group conflict can restrict reflective communicative action across groups without restricting it within groups. Individual actors within distinct ethnic or cultural groups can avoid the performative contradiction without denying all forms of reflective communicative action: they can merely restrict their reflective communicative action to other actors within their own groups. This coheres with the logics of group conflict, since it allows members of different cultural or ethnic groups to engage in unreflective and reflective communicative action within their own groups while acting strategically toward members of other groups. To respond to this problem, communicative theorists must augment moral-cognitive consistency motivations with stronger ones that prompt communication across group boundaries.

Normative characteristics of modernity may prompt communicative action across group boundaries via a modern moral consciousness and the cultural self-understanding of a modern worldview. Modern moral consciousness upholds universality through recourse to an impartial, moral point of view, one that accepts as legitimate only those norms that could be justifiable to all those affected by it.<sup>48</sup> While the legitimacy of such norms can only be grounded through actual, inclusive dialogue, the impetus to dialogue comes from the moral consciousness that such dialogue is needed. Thus, an impartial moral consciousness *precedes* dialogue through a sense of moral empathy.<sup>49</sup> While the problems with moral empathy without actual dialogue are well documented,<sup>50</sup> empathy may nevertheless remain an important motivational basis for its own dialogical correction. However, moral impartiality grounded in empathy itself derives from the cultural self-understandings of a modern worldview. A modern cultural worldview perceives that the universalistic and impartial moral point of view is superior to other conceptions of morality that restrict rational, communicative justification only to a select few, say a hierarchical caste or a specific cultural, ethnic, or religious group.

168 According to communicative theorists, the normative self-understanding of

modern cultures requires them to reach out beyond their specific group and attempt to include the other within the process of moral dialogue. Thus, actors are motivated to justify their norms across group boundaries via the socialization patterns, institutions, and political practices of various modern cultures.<sup>51</sup>

This set of motivations might prompt communicative action across group boundaries, yet its strength depends upon the specific self-understanding of a given modern culture. For instance, Rogers Smith notes that American political culture has floated between more liberal-universalistic and more particularistic, ascriptive self-understandings, the latter of which clearly coheres with the positional logic of group conflict. He cautions Americans from thinking that the former self-understanding would inevitably emerge victorious. Instead, specific social and political constellations allowed the liberal-universalistic self-understanding to emerge at certain times and the particularistic, ascriptive, positional self-understanding to emerge at others.<sup>52</sup> Thus, motivations based upon the normative characteristics of modern cultures might themselves require motivational support through independent political or social factors.

Such indeterminacy also undermines motivations for cross-group communication through publicity constraints. The capacity of actors to win political debates in the public domain is constrained by the audience addressed. Ideally, this audience will be unrestricted and will include members of multiple groups. Thus, if actors put forth arguments that cannot appeal beyond one's own particular group, then their arguments are less likely to be accepted by the broader public. Such publicity constraints could plausibly generate a process of public communication that crosses group boundaries. However, the force of such publicity constraints presupposes a public that is open to new perspectives, especially those that come from previously silent or disadvantaged groups, and critically tests the contributions that enter its domain, in order to avoid dogma or ill-informed judgement.<sup>53</sup>

In light of the logics of group conflict, publicity constraints may have limited motivating power. For instance, the positional logic could undermine the capacity for disadvantaged groups to constrain public arguments. If these groups are seen as inferior, their presence within an audience could nevertheless fail to constrain public arguments. Furthermore, the information logic may undermine publicity constraints by limiting the audience addressed by public actors. Since non-elite actors may confront disincentives to gaining information, they may rely on cheap, group-specific information sources. In turn, elite actors may experience strong motivations, based on the resource or political logics, to provide misleading or prejudicial information to members of their group. The result will be that public actors will not be constrained by a large, inclusive, and diverse audience; instead, they can cater to specific audiences populated by members of their own groups. In this way, positional stereotypes and misleading information will go unchecked, because members of other groups will not be included in the audience addressed.

This danger is especially relevant to the role of group-specific publics. Nancy Fraser argues that such 'subaltern publics' help disadvantaged groups to commu-

nicate more effectively and fairly within the broader public sphere. However, a critic might fear that these may degenerate into segmented, group-specific media markets susceptible to strategic manipulation by ethnic elites. Fraser is aware of this problem and conceptually distinguishes inclusive, subaltern *publics* from exclusive, subaltern *enclaves*.<sup>54</sup> However, she does not provide an account for how actors within subaltern publics are motivated to remain inclusive amid the information and positional logics of conflict.

Now, we must admit that communicative motivations are essential for reflective communicative action across group boundaries. It is probably unrealistic to expect strategic motivations alone to generate the normative commitment to reflective communicative action presupposed within models of inter-group dialogue. However, it is also unrealistic to assume that potentially reflective communicative actors are immune to the strategic logics of group conflict. In addition, communicative motivations are depicted as broad motivators: their force works gradually, through broad cultural developments and communicative processes. While this is a realistic portrait, it fails to provide a more precise and fine-grained understanding of how different actors face different constraints in engaging in inter-group dialogue. For this reason, we should more carefully examine communicative action amid the logics of group conflict.

## **Communicative Action Amid the Logics of Group Conflict: An Illustration**

While communicative motivations alone may not be sufficient to overcome strategic logics of group conflict, we must also realize that strategic logics need not always foster group conflict and may even encourage communicative action across group boundaries. Strategic logics can bear positive or negative consequences on inter-group dialogue, depending upon how they affect different actors. The strategic logics of group conflict need not *equally* affect all actors regarding their capacity to engage in inter-group dialogue. Strategic logics may greatly affect some actors while having little bearing on others. Moreover, strategic logics need not *uniformly* affect actors. While some strategic logics will hinder communicative action across group boundaries, others may actually aid it. Recognizing these factors should enable a more fine-grained understanding of which conditions enable certain actors to engage in inter-group dialogue.

An example of how the strategic logics of group conflict affect the capacity of actors to engage in cross-group communicative action is given by the reception of African-American civil rights within the Jewish-American public sphere from 1915 to 1935. This Jewish-American public sphere was anchored in Jewish labor and cultural organizations and Yiddish and English language newspapers, primarily in northern American cities. While this public consisted of divergent ideological perspectives, from socialist to conservative, its leadership clearly perceived itself as catering to a Jewish audience. For instance, the Yiddish press was

accessible only to a Jewish clientele, while the English press perceived its role as carrying specifically Jewish information overlooked by the mainstream press. Yet despite this group-specific orientation, this public displayed the rudiments of communicative action aimed at understanding the perspectives and concerns of African Americans.

First, unlike many group-specific media sources, such as Hutu hate-radio in Rwanda or Sinhalese newspapers in Sri Lanka, Jewish newspapers and organizations of this era did not simply concern themselves with mobilizing their own group strategically to press their own interests. Instead, actors within this public reached out beyond their narrow group concerns in order to engage African-American perspectives. Jewish newspapers displayed an ongoing interest both in the obstacles faced by African Americans and in their intellectual, artistic, and political achievements. Journalists from Jewish newspapers reported on meetings of African-American political organizations. In addition, leading African-American intellectual and political leaders, such as the scholar-activist W.E.B. DuBois and the labor leader A. Phillip Randolph, often addressed Jewish organizations. In this way, these civil society organizations arguably supported a group-specific, universalistic subaltern *public*, as opposed to an exclusive *enclave*.<sup>55</sup>

Second, this communication was significantly reflective. This is especially clear in its critical communication challenging the prevalent frameworks within which race relations were conducted. Mainstream American culture was criticized for its harsh, unjust treatment of African Americans, as was the positional belief of white racial superiority. More strikingly, Jewish newspapers would often criticize anti-black racism among Jews themselves. This self-critical stance was maintained amidst evidence of black anti-Semitism, and the Jewish press attempted to prevent a Jewish backlash against such sentiments.<sup>56</sup>

Third, communication within this public aimed at recognizing African Americans as viable and competent communicative partners, although the quality of such recognition is questionable. On the one hand, Jewish organizations invited participation from African-American speakers, while Jewish newspapers clearly recognized the moral and political status of African Americans as deserving of full civil and political rights. Yet on the other hand, some Jewish figures may have overemphasized their understanding of the African-American perspectives without recognizing what they did not know. This is clear in the tendency to portray African Americans as America's equivalent to the persecuted European Jew. Indeed, although pre-discursive empathy may have prompted Jews, many of whom had recently fled persecution in Europe, to open themselves to African-Americans' concerns, it ironically may have clouded their ability to understand them clearly. For example, Jewish philanthropists advised blacks to adopt the Jewish practice of creating separate, group-specific institutions like hospitals, neglecting how African Americans might interpret this in light of legal segregation.<sup>57</sup>

Still, in comparison with the mainstream press and public culture of the time,

the level of recognition accorded to African Americans was striking. Thus, it is worth examining both how the Jewish public sphere adopted a communicative orientation towards understanding across group boundaries and how certain obstacles constrained it. Attention to the logics of group conflict may shed some light on this issue. The key, I think, lies in the positional and security logics faced by Jewish Americans. Importantly, these logics affected Jews differently in the north and the south.

Regarding the positional logic, many northern Jews of this era did not feel fully 'white'. The perception of permanent foreignness and the presence of broader anti-Semitism hindered them from partaking in the positional logic that existed between whites and blacks. Yet in important ways, this public sphere did interpret Jewish identity in a positional manner that fostered positive relations with blacks. The Jewish public sphere interpreted Jewish identity as negotiating a fine line between assimilation into and rejection of the broader American culture. Having fled persecution in Europe, most Jews wished to find a home in America and could not reject its culture entirely. Nevertheless, most Jews were also afraid to lose their distinct identity. Thus, they had to construct a culture within a culture. But the interpretation of Jewish culture within this public sphere was strikingly positional. Jewish culture was perceived as morally superior to mainstream American culture. Indeed, the Jewish press often attributed Jewish racism to the inculcation of un-Jewish, mainstream ideas. By championing African-American causes, the Jewish public sphere could proclaim the Jews as America's 'chosen people', who had understood and internalized American ideals of equality and justice more fully than other Americans.<sup>58</sup>

This positional interpretation of Jewish identity in turn helped to shape the northern Jewish perception of the security logic. Clearly, the resource logic aggravated tensions between Jewish merchants and African-American workers, and this sometimes led to security problems between these groups.<sup>59</sup> But while northern Jews were aware of this, they perceived a stronger security threat from non-Jewish whites. Importantly, the 1915 Atlanta lynching of Leo Frank, a Jewish businessman charged with raping a white woman, impressed upon northern Jewish newspaper editors the common security threat that a partial, white criminal justice system posed to both Jews and blacks. In this way, criticizing the treatment of blacks by civil authorities could help Jews protect themselves from similar abuse.<sup>60</sup>

However, the positional and security logics had significantly different effects on southern Jews. Regarding the security logic, southern Jews' geographic proximity to the Frank trial and lynching may have intensified their perception of the security threat. Leonard Dinnerstein notes that, when northern Jewish organizations attempted to aid in Frank's legal defense, non-Jewish southerners reacted with virulent anti-Semitism. This reaction led southern Jews to attempt to assimilate more deeply into the white, southern mainstream.<sup>61</sup> A similar dynamic arose during the Scottsboro trial, when nine African-American boys were prosecuted

for allegedly raping two white women. While many northern Jewish individuals and organizations strongly supported the boys, many southern Jews remained wary. Indeed, when Rabbi Benjamin Goldstein of Montgomery publicly voiced his support for the boys, his congregation forced him to resign.<sup>62</sup> Dinnerstein concludes that, while most southern Jews may have privately supported African-American causes, the security logic forced them to remain publicly silent on these issues and go along with the mainstream.<sup>63</sup> In this case, the security logic deformed publicity constraints, transforming this communicative motivation into an obstacle hindering communicative action across group boundaries.

Whether or not through the security logic, several scholars also contend that southern Jewish identity became submerged into the broader southern white identity.<sup>64</sup> Southern Jews may have been perceived merely as a distinct white religious subgroup, whose social status would not have been significantly different from that of Presbyterians or Methodists in predominantly Baptist white communities. Alternatively, southern white 'philo-Semitism' may have helped to incorporate southern Jews into the white mainstream.<sup>65</sup> As a result, a distinct southern Jewish identity was less able to support the moral, positional logic that bolstered Jewish identification with African-American concerns in the north. Instead, southern Jewish identity may have been submerged into the broader white versus black positional logic. In this way, the positional and security logics help to clarify why southern Jews tended to be less publicly supportive of African-American civil rights than their northern co-religionists.

In examining this case, it is important to emphasize that there need not have been anything intrinsic to Jewish identity that fostered these divergent regional approaches to African-American issues. Indeed, present tensions belie any claim to an essential, transcendent connection between these groups. Instead, I hope to have clarified how strategic dynamics shaped the capacity for communicative action's orientation towards understanding across group boundaries. Moreover, the strategic dynamics that led to regional discrepancies may also ground other divergent attitudes. For instance, Michael Rogin uses the positional logic to argue that many Jews within the entertainment sector sought to gain acceptance into the white identity precisely by denigrating African Americans.<sup>66</sup> Similarly, James Glaser notes that older Jews tend to perceive themselves as an out-group in relation to mainstream white society and thus are more likely to empathize with and support African-American civil rights issues. Younger Jews, however, tend to feel more assimilated into white society. As a result, they possess a weaker sense of out-group identity and extend less support to African-American concerns.<sup>67</sup> Thus, the development and the motivating power of a collective identity that crosses the positional logic of group conflict is a contingent factor that may wax or wane, depending on diverse social and political factors.

## Strategic Action and Inter-Group Dialogue

Earlier, I argued that three theorists of inter-group dialogue presuppose the orientation towards understanding found in communicative action. I also outlined certain communicative motivations underlying the communicative action presupposed within inter-group dialogue. While communicative action and communicative motivations may be necessary for inter-group dialogue, my analysis of the Jewish public sphere suggests that they are insufficient. By examining strategic logics that affect inter-group dialogue, this case helps to realize two goals of this article: first, to develop an analysis regarding the conditions of inter-group communicative action that was more fine-grained than general recommendations regarding communicative motivations; and second, to clarify how specific strategic dynamics constrain and enable different actors in their capacities to engage in communicative action across group boundaries. My analysis of the Jewish public sphere also suggests that communicative motivations may sometimes undermine communication across group boundaries. Consistent with Iris Young's analysis, moral empathy led some actors in the Jewish public sphere to overlook black concerns about creating separate black institutions. In addition, the security logic created publicity constraints that hindered southern Jews from adopting the inclusive, communicative orientation towards black civil rights of their northern co-religionists. While the problem of empathy may be corrected through inter-group dialogue itself, the latter problem of deformed publicity constraints might not be similarly addressed.

This brings us to the third goal of this study: to prompt proponents of inter-group dialogue to think more strategically about how to foster inclusive communication across group boundaries. Specifically, theorists should give greater thought to which actors, policies, and institutional reforms can best harness strategic incentives to aid, rather than hinder, inter-group dialogue. In this section, I will address this third goal through three recommendations for either neutralizing the strategic logics of conflict or redirecting them in order to encourage inter-group dialogue.

My first recommendation is to use the strategic logics of conflict in order to identify which individuals or groups are best situated to engage in inter-group dialogue. For example, the information logic is not always equally borne by all actors in plural societies. Thomas Christiano notes that some actors, generally middle- or upper-class white-collar workers, face fewer obstacles in gaining information.<sup>68</sup> In a plural polity, these actors may be better able to gain viable information regarding the needs, interests, and perspectives of ethnic or cultural groups other than their own. They also could more easily gain information regarding common interests across group boundaries. This reasoning is illustrated by how activists in the American civil rights movement targeted their actions towards elite 'conscience constituencies' who possessed greater capacities to gain information.<sup>69</sup>

The importance of circumventing the information, political, and economic logics emerges among suggestions for post-conflict reconciliation in plural societies, which emphasize the role of ‘middle-level actors’, such as respected intellectuals or religious leaders. These actors are less constrained than the masses by the information logic, while they are less constrained than businesspeople and politicians by the resource and political logics.<sup>70</sup> Thus, they may more easily gain and disseminate information regarding the means and utility of mitigating group conflict, in order to facilitate the communicative exchange of perspectives across group boundaries. Still, the capacity of middle-level actors to foster reconciliation depends upon whether they perceive themselves as transcending positional group identities. If such actors perceive their identities as firmly entrenched within the positional logic, then they may be more likely to use their capacity to acquire and promulgate information to foster inter-group animosity. For example, some Hindu intellectuals fostered anti-Muslim sentiments in India by providing misleading historical information regarding disputed religious sites, like the Babri Masjid in Ayodhya.<sup>71</sup> Thus, we should also examine which actors are most likely to overcome the positional logic.

As the case of the Jewish public sphere suggests, not all group identities are equally affected by the positional logic of conflict. Some group identities may cross group boundaries so as to undermine positional conflict. Because gender clearly crosses ethnic group boundaries, women can sometimes play a mediating role in ethnically defined group conflict. Research shows that women are disproportionately represented within North American ‘anti-racist’ organizations. Furthermore, white female anti-racists often experience double stigmatization, by being either Jewish or lesbian. Because female, Jewish, and lesbian identities tend to occupy a positional status that does not fully cohere with the positional dynamic of white versus black, these actors are more likely to develop a level of moral empathy regarding the harms inflicted upon racial minorities.<sup>72</sup> In some circumstances, purely ethnic identities can cross positional group boundaries. In Nigeria in the late 1970s, the Yoruba were able to mediate Muslim–Christian tensions over Sharia law, because their regional, ethnic identity crossed this religious division. Note, however, that their ability to mediate conflicts on the religious dimension would diminish regarding purely regional or ethnic tensions.<sup>73</sup>

The case of the Jewish public sphere, illustrates a further point for theorists to recognize: inter-group dialogue may be more feasible where a society is divided along multiple group divisions. Where a strong binary division separates two groups, as exemplified by the strong, white–black division in the southern states at that time, inter-group dialogue is less possible; where different divisions create multiple, salient group identities, as existed in the northern states, inter-group dialogue among two or more disadvantaged groups may be more feasible.

My second recommendation is to examine policies that, while not directly providing strategic incentives to engage in inter-group dialogue, at least mitigate

strategic logics of conflict. For instance, Simone Chambers and Jeffrey Kopstein provide evidence that membership in xenophobic or hate associations tends to be drawn from working class individuals facing unemployment. Importantly, their explanation marries the resource and positional logics: these workers confront not only diminished material resources (which they perceive as caused by immigrants) but also diminished social standing (which they seek to rectify by asserting their superior ethnic status).<sup>74</sup> Thus, improving the economic lot of such workers can mitigate the resource and positional logics of conflict that hinder cross-group dialogue. Similarly, the security logic of conflict can diminish by reforming police procedures or hiring practices to ensure the impartiality of these coercive forces. Of course such policy reforms, while potentially neutralizing strategic logics of conflict, do not directly harness strategic action to foster inter-group dialogue. This task falls to the third recommendation: institutional reform.

Typically, civil society and the public sphere are identified as the home for inter-group dialogue and communication. This makes sense in light of the strategic logics of conflict, since civil society, when defined as a non-state, non-economic sphere of voluntary and informational organizations,<sup>75</sup> may insulate actors from the political and resource logics of group conflict. For this reason, Simone Chambers suggests that constitutional deliberations among Anglophone and Francophone Canadian citizens more robustly upheld the demands of communicative action when they took place in the non-decision-making forums of civil society.<sup>76</sup> While this argument is cogent, it is perhaps one-sided, since non-economic and non-state civil society actors do often play a role in fostering group conflict by enhancing positional values and generating false information.<sup>77</sup> Thus, institutional reforms of the public sphere should seek to mitigate these logics of conflict. For instance, taxation policies should grant exemptions only to those associations that do not discriminate based upon race, ethnicity, or religion.<sup>78</sup> In addition, governments can provide financial or logistical support for associations that intentionally foster inter-group communication, such as Catholic–Protestant reconciliation groups in Northern Ireland or Black–Korean or Black–Latino associations in Los Angeles.<sup>79</sup> Still, we must cede John Dryzek’s point that the ‘public sphere is not a formal institution and so cannot be designed’.<sup>80</sup> Consequently, while policies may promote some types of civil society actors, constitutional rights to freedom of association suggest that organizations fostering the positional logic of conflict cannot be reformed away.

Thus institutional reform aimed at encouraging inter-group communication should focus not only on civil society but also on the democratic state, specifically its electoral systems. While normative theorists of pluralism have begun to examine electoral systems, they have generally done so only with respect to enhancing the descriptive representation of disadvantaged ethnic or racial groups. However, as Donald Horowitz notes, certain electoral systems can counter the political logic of conflict by providing strategic incentives for candidates to appeal to voters across group boundaries.<sup>81</sup> Such strategic incentives clearly affect the

prospects for inter-group dialogue, since they present political candidates with new publicity constraints: if a candidate is more likely to win by espousing positions that appeal across group boundaries, that candidate must communicate in an inclusive manner and eschew ethnically exclusive appeals. In this way, electoral systems serve the more 'normative function' of structuring 'the boundaries of "acceptable" political discourse'.<sup>82</sup>

Importantly, assessing electoral systems in light of their ability to counter the political logic of conflict and to foster inter-group communication through more inclusive publicity constraints leads to conclusions that conflict with those of more purely normative theories. For instance, several theorists have followed Lani Guinier in advocating the cumulative vote in order to enhance minority representation.<sup>83</sup> They do so because the cumulative vote, which grants voters a number of votes equal to the number of seats in a multi-member district, enables minorities to place all of their votes for a single candidate, presumably one of their own race or ethnicity. But while the cumulative vote may assist minority voters to elect a representative from their group, its incentive structure also can reward ethnic extremist candidates who make exclusivist appeals. This differs from preferential voting systems, like the alternative vote and the single transferable vote, wherein voters rank candidates in preferential order. When a candidate either wins or falls beneath a threshold, any excess ballots are transferred to the candidates named as the second preference. Notably, candidates who gain few first preference votes can nevertheless get elected through second preference votes. Indeed, they can sometimes gain election over candidates who have many more first preference ballots than they. As Horowitz notes, this characteristic can provide an incentive for moderate candidates to appeal across group boundaries, in order to maximize second preference votes.

Of course, electoral systems alone certainly cannot provide sufficient incentives to motivate inter-group dialogue. Indeed, the presence of the single transferable vote in Northern Ireland has not emancipated that society from the logics of group conflict. However, we should also note that the replacement of the single transferable vote with the single-member district plurality system in 1929 arguably enabled the political dominance of Unionist politicians until 1969, when the political exclusion of Catholics exploded into the contemporary 'troubles'. In this sense, favorable electoral systems, like communicative motivations, are not sufficient for mitigating the logics of group conflict or for enabling communicative action across group boundaries. However, along with institutional reforms in the public sphere, policies aimed at mitigating the logics of group conflict, and actors favorably positioned within the logics of group conflict, accommodative electoral systems can be part of an environment conducive to inclusive communication. Communicative motivations, while absolutely necessary to realize the potential of such an environment, are unlikely to suffice. Thus, normative theorists of inter-group dialogue must pay attention to strategic logics in order to identify those actors, policies, and institutions that can realize the normative goals

of inter-group dialogue. This may be a tall order, but justice among groups within a plural society may require it.

## Notes

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1. Simone Chambers (1996) *Reasonable Democracy: Jürgen Habermas and the Politics of Discourse*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Shane O'Neill (1997) *Impartiality in Context*. Albany, NY: SUNY Press. Bhikhu Parekh (2000) *Rethinking Multiculturalism: Cultural Diversity and Political Theory*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Charles Taylor (1993) 'The Politics of Recognition', in Amy Gutmann (ed.) *Multiculturalism and the Politics of Recognition*, pp. 23–73. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. James Tully (1996) *Strange Multiplicity: Constitutionalism in an Age of Diversity*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Iris Marion Young (1990) *Justice and the Politics of Difference*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Iris Marion Young (1996) 'Communication and the Other', in Seyla Benhabib (ed.) *Democracy and Difference*, pp. 120–35. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Iris Marion Young (1997) 'Asymmetrical Reciprocity', *Constellations* 3: 340–63.
2. Will Kymlicka (1995) *Multicultural Citizenship*, p. 171. Oxford: Oxford University Press. The criticism of Kymlicka's theory as excessively juridical is found in Melissa Williams (1995) 'Justice among Groups, Political not Juridical', *Political Theory* 23 (Feb.): 67–91.
3. Iris Young's substantive argument for group-based representation admits of ambiguities regarding which groups deserve such representation, which requires the creation of a discursive 'public' to adjudicate this controversy. Young (1990: n. 1), 133. Gutmann and Thompson note that group-based affirmative action policies involve disputed substantive claims, which should be resolved through moral argument. Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson (1996) *Democracy and Disagreement*, pp. 307–45. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Kymlicka admits that an egalitarian theory of justice among groups requires that indigenous groups' rights to land must be revised if they come to function less as external protections than as unequal opportunities to generate revenue. Kymlicka (n. 2), 110.
4. Kymlicka notes that a liberal theory of minority cultural group rights might sometimes grant external protections to groups that practice illiberal, internal restrictions. In this instance, dialogue and moral criticism are needed. Kymlicka (n. 2), 171. Taylor notes the need for a dialogical, 'fusion of horizons' if one is to evaluate the potential worth of different cultural practices. Taylor (n. 1). Finally, Tully (n. 1) advocates dialogue in order to distinguish what is essential versus accidental in a morally questionable cultural group practice.
5. Jürgen Habermas (1984) *Theory of Communicative Action*, tr. Thomas McCarthy, vol. 1, p. 86. Boston, MA: Beacon.
6. Jürgen Habermas (1987) *Theory of Communicative Action*, tr. Thomas McCarthy, vol. 2, p. 86. Boston, MA: Beacon. Habermas (1993) *Justification and Application*, tr. Ciaran P. Cronin, p. 6. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
7. Habermas (n. 5), 288–9.
8. Young (1996: n. 1), 130–1.
9. Habermas (1987: n. 6), 331.

10. James Johnson (1991) 'Habermas on Strategic and Communicative Action', *Political Theory* 19 (May): 181–201.
11. Robert Axelrod (1984) *The Evolution of Cooperation*. New York: Basic Books.
12. Stephen K. White (1988) *The Recent Work of Jürgen Habermas*, p. 83. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
13. Young (1996: n. 1), 123–4.
14. James Tully (1989) 'Wittgenstein and Political Philosophy', *Political Theory* 17 (May): 186.
15. One should note that in her most recent formulation of her theory, Young explicitly acknowledges her reliance on communicative action, even as she distances her model of inter-group dialogue from Habermas's excessively rational model of argumentation. See Young (2000) *Inclusion and Democracy*, pp. 47–51. New York: Oxford University Press. In what follows, I examine Young's earlier articulations of inter-group dialogue in order to elucidate more clearly *how* her model relies on communicative action.
16. Tully (n. 1), 112; Taylor (n. 1), 67; Young, (1997: n. 1), 353.
17. Tully (n. 1), 124–9; Taylor (n. 1), 58, 67; Young (1990: n. 1), 37.
18. Taylor (n. 1), 71; Young (1997: n. 1), 351; Tully (n. 14); Tully (n. 1), 202.
19. Taylor (n. 1), 66; Young (1997: n. 1), 354.
20. Tully (n. 1), 24–5.
21. Jean Cohen and Andrew Arato (1992) *Civil Society and Political Theory*, p. 472. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
22. Habermas (1987: n. 6), 57.
23. James Fearon and David Laitin (1996) 'Explaining Interethnic Cooperation', *American Political Science Review* 90 (Dec.): 715–35.
24. The most detailed account of the resource logic is found in Russell Hardin (1995) *One for All: The Logic of Group Conflict*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Hardin acknowledges that much of our potential identifications are given to us externally, through objective factors like sex or skin color. However, the presence of multiple potential objective and subjective identities provides individuals great autonomy over which identification is salient in a given situation (pp. 6–10, 186–9, 195). Crawford Young (1976) *The Politics of Cultural Pluralism*. Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press. This provides substantial empirical evidence of the fluidity of racial, ethnic, and cultural identities within conflict-prone plural societies. For other accounts of ethnic conflict based on the resource logic, see Robert Bates (1974) 'Ethnic Competition and Modernization in Contemporary Africa', *Comparative Political Studies* 6 (Jan.). David Lake and Donald Rothchild (1996) 'Containing Fear: The Origins and Management of Ethnic Conflict', *International Security* 21 (Fall): 5–41. Susan Olzak (1992) *The Dynamics of Ethnic Competition and Conflict*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
25. Donald Horowitz (1985) *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, p. 217. Berkeley: University of California Press. See also Young (n. 24).
26. Alvin Rabushka and Kenneth Shepsle (1971) *Politics in Plural Societies*. Columbus, OH: Merrill. Horowitz (n. 25). Donald Horowitz (1991) *A Democratic South Africa*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
27. Horowitz (n. 26).
28. On Spain, see David Laitin (1995) 'National Revivals and Violence', *Archives Européennes de Sociologie* 36 (Spring): 3–43. On Northern Ireland, see Caroline Kennedy-Pipe (1997) *The Origins of the Present Troubles in Northern Ireland*. London and New York: Longman.
29. Horowitz (n. 25), 157–8, 165.
30. Jack Snyder and Karen Ballentine (1996) 'Nationalism and the Marketplace of Ideas', *International Security* 21 (Fall): 5–41. See also Hardin (n. 24), 88–91; Lake and Rothchild (n. 24), 102.

31. Paul Brass (1997) *Theft of an Idol: Text and Context in the Representation of Collective Violence*, p. 156. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
32. C. Vann Woodward (1974) *The Strange Career of Jim Crow*, 3rd edn, revised. New York: Oxford University Press.
33. Hardin (n. 24), 156–63. See also Lake and Rothchild (n. 24).
34. Patrick Buckland (1981) *A History of Northern Ireland*, pp. 120–1. Dublin: Gill & Macmillan. Kennedy-Pipe (n. 28), 44–5.
35. Brass (n. 31), 274.
36. Olzak (n. 24).
37. Carol Conaway (1999) 'Crown Heights: Politics and Press Coverage of the Race War that Wasn't', *Polity* 32 (Fall): 101–2. Paula McClain and Joseph Stewart (1999) *Can we All Get Along? Racial and Ethnic Minorities in American Politics*, pp. 149–54. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
38. Kenneth Karst (1993) *Law's Promise, Law's Expression: Visions of Power in the Politics of Race, Gender, and Religion*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
39. Conaway (n. 37), 101–2.
40. Cohen and Arato (n. 21), 435–42.
41. Chambers (n. 1), 245.
42. Fearon and Laitin (n. 23), 715.
43. Iris Marion Young (1993) 'Together in Difference: Transforming the Logic of Group Conflict', in Judith Squires (ed.) *Principled Positions: Postmodernism and the Rediscovery of Value*, pp. 121–150. London: Lawrence & Wishart.
44. Hardin (n. 24), 142–7.
45. Cohen and Arato (n. 21), 387.
46. Jürgen Habermas (1990) *Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action*, tr. Christian Lenhardt and Shierry Weber Nicholson, pp. 94–102. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
47. Chambers (n. 1), 91–2.
48. Note that moral universality, understood as norms justifiable to all, need not mean normative uniformity, understood as norms that treat all individuals the same. Thus, group-specific rights or policies, such as affirmative action, self-government rights, and mirror representation, can be universally justified even though they may not treat all individuals uniformly. For a discussion of this point, see Michael Rabinder James (1999) 'Tribal Sovereignty and the Intercultural Public Sphere', *Philosophy and Social Criticism* 25 (Sept.): 66. Note that Hardin defines universalistic norms in terms of uniformity. He defends them because they provide fewer incentives for group-based mobilization and conflict (n. 24), 77–9 and 107–42. Communicative theory would treat Hardin's position as one possible argument within an inclusive dialogue, yet one that can be rejected without violating normative universality.
49. William Rehg (1991) 'Discourse and the Moral Point of View: Deriving a Dialogical Principle of Universality', *Inquiry* 34: 77.
50. Young (1997: n. 1).
51. Cohen and Arato (n. 21), 387–8. Habermas (n. 46), 207. Note that Cohen and Arato conclude that this motivation precludes reflective communicative action with non-modern groups. A modern culture can tolerate such groups but cannot generate communicatively grounded solidarity with them.
52. Rogers M. Smith (1993) 'Beyond Tocqueville, Myrdal, and Hartz: The Multiple Traditions in America', *American Political Science Review* 87 (Sept.): 549–66.
53. James Bohman (1996) *Public Deliberation*, pp. 26, 39, and 200–24. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
54. Nancy Fraser (1992) 'Rethinking the Public Sphere', in Craig Calhoun (ed.) *Habermas*

- and the Public Sphere, pp. 121–8. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. The concern with segmented ethnic media markets is found in Snyder and Ballentine (n. 30), 67–81. See also Bohman (n. 53), 81.
55. Hasia Diner (1977) *In the Almost Promised Land: American Jews and Blacks, 1915–1935*, pp. 52, 139, 151, 182, and 207. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
56. *Ibid.*, 62, 71–7, 92, 104, and 141.
57. *Ibid.*, 74 and 177–8.
58. *Ibid.*, 72, 89, 114–15, and 237–8.
59. *Ibid.*, 15 and 72–3.
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